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ne positive effect of the euro crisis is that 
it  has  provoked  Europe  to  engage  in  a 
profound debate on the form and degree 
of  federalism  it  needs.  Even  if,  until  recently, 
many  would  have  argued  that  Europe  is  not  a 
federal state, the EU already has many elements 
of  such  a  governance  model  in  place,  of  which 
European  citizens  are  hardly  aware.  Many 
competences  are  uniquely  attributed  to  the  EU. 
Legislation in several fields of EU competence can 
be adopted with a qualified majority of member 
states.  Only  in a  few  areas, such as  taxation,  is 
unanimity  still  required,  even  after  the  new 
Lisbon  Treaty  has  come  into  effect.  The  same 
applies for changes to the EU Treaty itself. 
Within  the  monetary  union,  it  is  even  more 
important to establish a clear hierarchy of rules 
and a division of competences than for the single 
market.  On  the  monetary  policy  side,  this  was 
well worked out in the Maastricht Treaty. On the 
fiscal  policy  side,  however,  this  was  less  well 
developed in the Treaty, and was watered down 
in  the  2003  review  of  the  1997  Stability  and 
Growth  Pact  (SGP).  In  addition,  member  states 
started  to  hide  behind  their  sovereignty  when 
rules had to respected, or dealt with the problems 
too  diplomatically,  as  if  the  eurozone  was  an 
intergovernmental  construction.  The  EU  is  now 
engaged  not  only  in  updating  the  rules  to 
improve  economic  governance  in  the  ‘six-pack’, 
but it is also addressing broader elements in the 
‘euro-plus  pact’  to  strengthen  economic 
convergence  primarily  between  the  member 
states of the eurozone.  
The  big  question  is  whether  the  new  rules  are 
sufficiently  comprehensive  to  ensure  that 
economic  and  monetary  union  will  be 
sustainable,  and  whether  they  will  be  well 
enforced and respected. Furthermore, the debate 
on the Euro-plus Pact has highlighted that further 
convergence  is  necessary,  although  there  is  no 
real  agreement  as  to  where  this  is  needed,  and 
where  not.  Unlike  monetary  union,  economic 
union has never been clearly defined. The need 
for  enhanced  cooperation  in  the  eurozone  has 
also  reinforced  the  old  fears  of  constructing  a 
‘two-speed’ Europe.  
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  make  an 
assessment of what has been put on the table in 
response to the euro crisis – and what more needs 
to be done. We start with a brief assessment of the 
measures taken in the ‘six-pack’ and the debate 
on  the  Euro-plus  Pact.  We  then  discuss  some 
operational  elements  of  the  European  Stability 
Mechanism and address the question whether the 
EU is a transfer union. We conclude by proposing 
a  pragmatic  agenda  of  items  on  which  the  EU 
could advance towards a more federal economic 
union. 
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The ‘Six-pack’ and the Euro-plus Pact  
With the measures referred to as ‘Six-pack’, the 
EU  proposed  to  improve  European  governance, 
by correcting the weaknesses of the Growth and 
Stability Pact and broadening the macroeconomic 
elements of the Maastricht criteria. The package, 
which  is  composed  of  six  different  measures 
grouped  under  three  different  areas  of  action, 
was adopted by the European Parliament and the 
EU  Council  under  the  co-decision  procedure. 
Reactions from member states demonstrated the 
sensitivity to allocating more powers to the EU in 
this  domain.  The  question  remains  whether  the 
rules  will  be  sufficiently  comprehensive  and 
properly enforced once they are in place, as this is 
one of the flaws revealed by the current crisis. 
The  six  different  measures  consist  of  the 
European Semester for strengthened coordination 
of economic and budgetary policies, a framework 
for  preventing  and  correcting  excessive 
government  deficits  (a  ‘reinforced’  Stability  and 
Growth  Pact)  and  a  framework  for  preventing 
and  correcting  macroeconomic  imbalances.  The 
measures are subdivided between the preventive 
– aimed at preventing a crisis of public finances 
from  happening  again  –  and  the  corrective  –
intended  to  give  appropriate  incentives  to 
member  states  to  return  to  the  right  path. 
Included  amongst  the  latter  are  semi-automatic 
sanctions imposed by the European Commission 
in instances where the rules are not respected and 
that can only be cancelled by a decision taken by 
a qualified majority of member states in the EU 
Council, the ‘reverse majority’.  
The European Commission is assigned a crucial 
role  in  the  ‘six-pack’  for  macroeconomic  and 
fiscal surveillance, which has ruffled feathers in 
many  member  states.  France  and  Germany, 
which were behind the weakening of the Pact in 
2003,  had  strong  reservations  regarding  the 
automaticity of sanctions. Other states argue that 
the  adoption  of  national  budgets  is  a  unique 
responsibility  of  national  parliaments,  which 
cannot  be  overruled  by  an  unelected 
administration. It is evident, however, that only a 
closer  monitoring  of  fiscal  policies  can  help  to 
prevent future fiscal crises in the eurozone, and 
that a central body needs to be clearly appointed 
in charge and given overriding powers. 
In addition to these measures, EU governments 
have  also,  at  the  insistence  of  Germany, 
embarked  on  introducing  a  broader  set  of 
measures  aimed  at  improving  the 
competitiveness  of  the  EU  and  the  eurozone 
member  states.  Better  monitoring  of  certain 
indicators in the different member states should 
prevent the EU, and in particular the eurozone, 
from  falling  into  the  same  situation  again.  This 
concern led to the creation in March 2010 of the 
Van Rompuy Group, named after the President of 
the European Council, and in March 2011 to the 
adoption  of  the  Euro-plus  Pact  by  the  17 
eurozone  member  states,  and  six  other  non-
eurozone states. The outcome of both initiatives, 
however,  indicates  that  a  broader  debate  about 
the nature of economic union would be required 
before agreement on specific detailed measures, 
as discussed below, can be achieved. 
The report of the Van Rompuy Group (published 
in  October  2010)  underscored  the  measures 
proposed  by  the  European  Commission  in  the 
‘six-pack’, such as the preventive and corrective 
measures,  and  the  automaticity  of  sanctions.  It 
proposed  the  use  of  a  limited  number  of 
indicators  as  measures  to  prevent  imbalances 
between  EU  member  states,  and  particularly 
between the eurozone members. The report also 
stressed the need to make the crisis management 
framework a permanent feature. But a proposal 
to institute a Committee of Wise Men to monitor 
and  make  recommendations  on  the state  of  the 
European economies was not retained.  
The  Van  Rompuy  Group’s  recommendations 
were  superseded  by  the  Deauville  compromise 
reached  between  the  heads  of  state  and 
government of France and Germany meeting the 
same day as the report was published. In return 
for  delaying  the  automaticity  of  warnings  and 
sanctions,  France  agreed  with  Germany  for  a 
revision  of  the  EU  Treaty’s  ‘no  bail-out’  clause, 
and  the  creation  of  a  permanent  crisis 
management mechanism with the participation of 
the private sector. The compromise showed that, 
above  all,  the  larger  member  states  object  to  a 
more federal nature of the EU. In its readings of 
the ‘six-pack’, however, the European Parliament 
insisted  on  the  automaticity  of  sanctions, 
requested  a  permanent  economic  dialogue  with 
the  finance  ministers  and  demanded  increased 
powers  for  the  European  Commission  in EU FEDERALISM IN CRISIS | 3 
 
gathering information.1 It should be recalled that 
the Parliament had no role at all under the 1997 
SGP, a ‘federal’ anomaly, but that its role in the 
initial  Commission  proposals  to  improve 
economic governance was also very limited.2 
The  federal  nature  of  the  economic  governance 
package continued to be critical. In early 2011, the 
German government proposed the adoption of a 
‘Competiveness Pact’ in return for its support to 
the  extension  of  the  firepower  of  the  European 
Financial  Stability  Facility  (see  below).  Three 
quantifiable  indicators  would  function  as 
benchmarks  to  judge  the  competitiveness  of 
eurozone member states, and states would begin 
work  on  a  series  of  six  measures  to  enhance 
competitiveness  in  the  areas  of  labour  markets, 
tax and fiscal policy. These measures include the 
abolishment  of  automatic  wage  indexation,  the 
mutual  recognition  of  diplomas,  a  harmonised 
corporate  tax  base  and  the  introduction  of 
national bank resolution regimes. Some of these 
measures  are  pure  single  market  matters, 
however, and should in fact apply to the EU as a 
whole (see the table in the Annex).  
The ‘Euro-plus Pact’, as it was later denominated, 
was signed on March 11th by the 17 eurozone and 
six other non-eurozone member states. However, 
it  would  have  been  preferable  if  the  list  of 
measures  had  resulted  from  an  open  debate  on 
the  rationale  of  economic  union,  and  what 
initiatives  could  be  better  coordinated  at  EU 
rather  than  at  national  level.  Instead,  the 
measures came as a result of the explicit demand 
by one member state, and on the basis of a flawed 
concept  of  what  constitutes  ‘competitiveness’. 
The  idea  behind  the  Pact  is  that  higher 
                                                   
1  On  the  automaticity of  sanctions,  the  EP  compromise 
foresees  that  in  case  the  Council  does  not  adopt  a 
Commission  recommendation  in  the  first  instance,  or 
does not take a vote at all, the Commission shall, after a 
cooling-off period of one month, again put forward the 
same  decision.  This  recommendation  is  adopted 
automatically,  unless  within  10  days  a  majority  of  the 
eurozone  countries  rejects  it.  The  vote  of  the  member 
state(s)  concerned  would  not  count 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en/headlines/content
/20110429FCS18371/html/Economic-governance-
package-explained).  
2 The EP role in the original Commission proposals for 
the six-pack of 29 September 2010 was also very limited 
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/eu_econ
omic_situation/2010-09-eu_economic_governance_ 
proposals_en.htm). 
productivity  leads  to  higher  competitiveness, 
which  is  not  always  supported  in  reality  (see 
Gros,  2011).  The  actual  system  of  economic 
governance  that  is  emerging  thus  consists  of 
debtor  countries  being  obliged  to  accept 
prescriptions  on  fiscal  policy  and  structural 
reforms imposed by creditor countries, which are 
free to conduct their economic policy without any 
meaningful  interference.3  In  addition,  the  gap 
between  the  eurozone  and  non-eurozone 
countries  is  being  widened,  even  if  six  non-
eurozone member states signed-up to the Pact. 
A complete anomaly is that the progress on and 
compliance  with  the  Euro-plus  Pact  will  be 
monitored by the Heads of State and Government 
(HoSG). This directly contradicts the conventional 
EU structure, in which the European Commission 
acts  as  the  guardian  of  the  EU  Treaties,  and 
underlines  the  tensions  that  exist  between  the 
Commission and most member states. Moreover, 
HoSG  does  not  exist  as  a  structure,  which 
immediately raises the question whether the Pact 
will be monitored at all. 
The European Stability Mechanism 
By its nature, the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM)  combines  both  federal  and 
intergovernmental elements. It is federal as it uses 
the reputation and ratings of the best sovereigns 
of the EU to borrow in the market and to lend to 
member states with financing problems. But the 
decision-making  is  intergovernmental:  every 
eurozone member state must agree on the scheme 
and  ratify  the  Treaty  change,  and  decisions  to 
provide  loans  are  also  taken  by  unanimity.  In 
addition,  liability  to  the  fund  is  limited  to  the 
amount of each country’s share of the capital. 
The  ESM  was  the  (provisional)  conclusion  to 
more than one year of sovereign crisis in the EU, 
and  should  become  a  €500  billion  permanent 
fund  from  2013  onwards.  It  will  take  over  the 
functions  of  the  temporary  €60  billion  Treaty-
based  European  Financial  Stability  Mechanism 
Fund  (EFSM)  and  the  €440  billion 
intergovernmental  European  Financial  Stability 
Facility (EFSF) created in May 2010 to deal with 
the  widening  problems  in  Europe’s  southern 
                                                   
3  See  editorial  by  Cinzia  Alcidi  and  Karel  Lannoo, 
“Competitiveness  with  17  or  27”,  CEPS  Newsletter, 
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rim.4  The  ESM  will  only  formally  start  after  a 
change to the EU Treaty has been ratified by all 
the member states. This step is necessary as the 
Maastricht  Treaty  prohibits  monetary  financing 
and the bail-out of other member states (Arts 123 
and 125). The change was initially seen as almost 
impossible  given  the  problems  experienced  in 
ratifying the Lisbon Treaty. 
The  EFSF  statutes  state  that  all  the  most 
important  decisions  have  to  be  taken  by 
unanimity:  “The  Guarantors  agree  that  the 
matters  affecting  their  roles  and  liabilities  as 
Guarantors shall require to be approved by them 
on a unanimous basis” (EFSF, Art. 105). Similar 
clauses will apply to the draft ESM, which states 
that decisions by mutual agreement concern the 
granting  of  financial  assistance,  the  terms  and 
conditions  of  financial  assistance,  the  lending 
capacity of the ESM and changes to the menu of 
instruments.5 Initially, the EFSF did not allow the 
fund  to  directly  intervene  in  secondary  bond 
markets,  but  this  was  changed  at  the  Eurozone 
Council of 21 July 2011. The Council allowed for 
intervention, but only on the condition that it was 
undertaken  “by  mutual  agreement  of  the 
EFSF/ESM  Member  States  to  avoid  contagion” 
(the initial draft of the Euro Council conclusions 
had  even  mentioned  “unanimous”  agreement).6 
This restriction does not augur well, however, for 
the future of the EFSF, given the disagreements 
on this subject in the European Central Bank, and 
the limited size of the fund as compared to the 
amounts  of  outstanding  debt  of  the  troubled 
southern  European  member  states  and  Ireland. 
Also the ESM will be allowed to buy bonds in the 
secondary markets.7  
                                                   
4  The  European  Financial  Stability  Mechanism  (EFSM), 
created  in  April  2010  as  a  temporary  financing 
mechanism of €60 billion loans for Greece, Portugal and 
Ireland,  is  based  upon  an  EU  Treaty  facility  to  allow 
financial  assistance  to  a  member  state  in  difficulties. 
Under the EFSM, the borrower is the European Union. 
5  Term  Sheet  on  the  European  Stability  Mechanism,  21 
March 2011. 
6 Statement by the Heads of State or Government of the 
euro area and EU institutions, EU Council, 21 July 2011, 
p. 3. 
7 “The ESM can purchase the bonds of a Member State, 
which is experiencing severe financing problems, on the 
primary market, with the objective of maximizing the cost 
efficiency  of  the  support.  Conditions  and  modalities 
under which bond purchasing would be conducted will 
The Council of 21 July furthermore decided that 
the  EFSF  can  also  participate  in  bank 
recapitalisations “to address contagion”. This was 
confirmed  at  the  26  0ctober  2011  Eurozone 
summit meeting, but only as a resort, if private 
and national funding sources are exhausted. But 
the  full  lessons  of  the  2008  episode  with  bank 
rescues will have to be taken into account, as the 
Council stated, meaning that such recapitalisation 
will have to be administered at EU level in full 
compliance  with  EU  state  aid  rules.  This  again 
emphasises the need for the complete integration 
of the EFSF into the Community structure, which 
is unclear for the time being. 
A transfer union and fiscal federalism  
As  a  result  of  the  large  rescue  packages  for 
peripheral EU member states, the public debate in 
some  northern  member  states  has  characterised 
the EU as a ‘transfer union’. It is argued that the 
EU  could  only  continue  to  exist  as  a  result  of 
large  transfers  from  the  north  to  the  south.  In 
reality,  however,  such  transfers  have  only 
occurred so far in the context of the EU budget 
(structural  and  cohesion  funds),  and,  in  the 
sphere  of  the  euro-crisis,  are  loans  to  troubled 
states,  albeit  at  preferential  rates.  The  transfer 
would  only  materialise  in  the  event  of  non-
repayment. 
From a fiscal point of view, the EU today is still 
far  cry  from  a  genuine  federal  construction. 
While,  in  the  sense  of  fiscal  federalism, 
redistribution takes place at the EU level, it only 
concerns  a  very  limited  part  of  total  public 
spending. The EU budget represents less than 1% 
of the EU’s GDP, compared to about 20% in the 
US.  Moreover,  around  40%  is  spent  on  the 
Common  Agricultural  Policy  and  rural 
development,  with  direct  payments  to  farmers 
accounting  for  approximately  80%  of  the  costs. 
There  is  really  no  plausible  rationale  for  this 
policy under the theory of fiscal federalism, i.e. 
that it can be done better at EU than at the local 
level. The other large chunk of spending, under 
regional  and  structural  programmes,  could  be 
considered as genuinely federal. However, many 
                                                                                      
be specified in the Decision on the terms and conditions 
of financial assistance.” The latter provision implies that 
this should also be decided upon by mutual agreement. 
See Term Sheet on the European Stability Mechanism, 21 
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other  forms  of  spending  could,  in  a  ‘federal’ 
sense, be better assigned at the EU level, as they 
could  be  more  efficiently  allocated.  This  is  for 
example  the  case  for  spending  on  research  and 
development,  cross-border  infrastructures, 
external actions, defence or elements of industrial 
policy. The EU has a large R&D programme, the 
Framework Programme for Research, but again, 
this  fund  represents  only  about  7%  of  national 
spending on R&D. For the other areas, the budget 
offers some support, but they are very limited in 
comparison to national expenditures or the real 
needs for an efficient policy. 
Hence, to label the EU as a ‘transfer union’ is a 
complete misnomer in the current circumstances.8 
What  could  usefully  be  done  however  at  this 
time, as also with a debate on economic union, 
would be to engage the EU member states in a 
healthy  exploration  of  fiscal  federalism,  i.e. 
whether  and  how  to  establish  a  normative 
framework  for  the  assignment  of  functions  to 
different  levels  of  government  and  the 
appropriate  fiscal  instruments  for  carrying  out 
these  functions.  This  could  demonstrate,  in  the 
context of the huge current budgetary constraints 
for governments and the upcoming EU financial 
perspectives 2014-2021, that efficiency gains could 
be realised by allocating expenditure differently 
in the EU. 
But  expenditure  also  means  resources.  The  EU 
budget  is  not  very  federal  in  its  sources  either. 
The largest part of the EU budget is limited to a 
small  share  of  the  gross  national  income 
(maximum  1.04%)  of  the  member  states,  and 
increasingly  comes  from  direct  contributions 
from  the  member  states  (accounting  for  about 
60%  of  the  EU  budget).  The  EU  has  recently 
launched  a  debate  for  one  or  more  new  own 
resources, but it is very unlikely that the member 
states will be willing to open a discussion on the 
subject.  Recent  EU  budget  discussions  have 
proven to be very acrimonious, with insistence by 
some  parties  on  numerous  exceptions,  which 
makes it almost impossible to work out who gets 
what (see Haug et al., 2011). Current budgetary 
constraints make it doubtful that big changes will 
be  made  in  the  next  round  of  the  EU  financial 
perspectives  expected  to  start  in  2012.  And  the 
limited importance of own resources gives the EU 
                                                   
8 See Heinen (2011) for an overview. 
member states easy leverage over the European 
Commission. An example of a possible new own 
resource  for  the  EU  budget,  following  the 
financial  crisis,  is  a  bank  tax,  or  possibly  a 
financial  transaction  tax,  but  this  would 
disproportionally come from member states with 
large financial sectors, and thus seems difficult to 
implement in practice.9  
A pragmatic agenda 
Given  the  political  sensitivities  surrounding 
‘more Europe’ at this stage and for the foreseeable 
future, the EU will have to extract the most it can 
out  of  the  available  federal  instruments  and 
institutions.  
A broad role for the ECB and bank 
recapitalisation through the EFSF 
Since the beginning of the financial crisis, the ECB 
has  lowered  its  criteria  for  liquidity-providing 
operations  to  the  financial  sector,  and  with  the 
start  of  the  sovereign  crisis,  also  started  to 
directly buy government bonds in the markets. In 
so doing, the ECB has expanded its mandate from 
the  maintenance  of  price  stability  to  broader 
financial stability considerations. The purchase of 
bonds,  however,  has  not  been  a  consensual 
decision by the ECB, as evidenced most clearly by 
the  recent  departure  of  Jurgen  Stark  from  its 
board.  
The ECB was initially characterised as a central 
bank  with  a  narrow  mandate,  i.e.  the 
maintenance of price stability. The financial crisis, 
however,  has  shown  that  a  central  bank  that 
myopically focuses on price stability may actually 
fuel  asset  price  bubbles  through  a  process  of 
excessive credit creation, as was the case in the 
run-up to the crisis in several eurozone member 
states, but also in the US. A trade-off may thus 
exist  between  price  stability  and  financial 
stability,  which  requires  a  central  bank  to  also 
monitor  the  evolution  of  credit  expansion  and 
asset  prices  (De  Grauwe  &  Gros,  2009).  How 
financial stability is defined and what this means 
for the operational framework of the ECB remain 
open  questions,  however.  In  general  terms,  a 
                                                   
9 The European Commission proposed a transaction tax 
on 28 September 2011, but it is very unlikely that this will 
be approved by all the member states, and may thus be 
approved as ‘enhanced cooperation’, which will make it 
even less effective.  6 | KAREL LANNOO 
 
broadening  of  the  mandate  would  require  the 
identification  of  monetary  tools  (other  than  the 
interest  rate)  to  be  used  in  order  to  avoid 
excessive  credit  creation,  as  well  as  a  closer 
involvement of the ECB in financial supervision. 
The  latter  has  already  taken  place  with  the 
creation  of  the  European  Systemic  Risk  Board 
within the ECB.  
Pro-active  intervention  of  the  ECB  in  capital 
markets, however, meets fundamental opposition 
in some circles and member states, particularly in 
Germany. It has been argued that this exceeds the 
mandate  of  the  ECB,  reduces  the  disciplinary 
mechanism of capital markets and fuels inflation. 
Prominent German policy-makers, including the 
Head  of  State  Christian  Wulff  and  Bundesbank 
President  Jens  Weidmann,  have  openly  voiced 
this  view.10  Weidmann  has  also  stated  that  the 
democratic and accountability framework would 
not  justify  such  initiatives.  Others  have  argued 
that the ‘runs’ on the sovereign debt can only be 
countered  in  this  way,  as,  within  a  monetary 
union, member states do not dispose of the means 
to stop such dynamics, or prevent the movement 
of  funds  to  other  countries.11  The  open 
disagreements  about  bond  purchases,  however, 
have a very damaging impact on the markets. 
A  European  form  of  a  Troubled  Asset  Relief 
Programme (TARP), as implemented in the US in 
2008 in response to the financial crisis, has been 
suggested  by  some.12  Through  a  euro-TARP, 
banks  with  low  levels  of  capitalisation  and/or 
large exposures to distressed sovereigns could be 
refinanced by the EFSF. In return, banks would 
have  to  maintain  their  credit  lines  and  loan 
portfolios,  while  a  central  supervisory  entity 
would  closely  monitor  bank  risks.  It  has  been 
proposed  that  banks  will  need  to  finance  the 
governments  concerned  at  the  ECB’s  discount 
rate  until  the  market  stabilises.  Assisted  banks 
will also have to respect conditions imposed by 
the EU’s state aid authorities regarding the non-
discriminatory and temporary nature of aid and 
the need for adequate remuneration. The decision 
of  October  26th,  however  took  a  very  distorted 
picture of the capital needs of the banking sector 
                                                   
10  See  for  example  the  remarks  of  Jens  Weidmann,  as 
quoted in the Frankfurter Allgemeine, 19 September 2011. 
11 See Paul Krugman, New York Times, 11 September 2011. 
12 See George Soros in the Financial Times, 29 September 
2011 and Lannoo (2011a). 
in using a risk-weighted assets capital ratio (Tier 
1),  with  limited  adjustments  for  sovereign 
exposures  (see  Lannoo,  2011b).  This  again 
benefitted the banks of the two largest eurozone 
member states.   
Strict application of the new six-pack rules 
The implementation of the new SGP will need to 
be  vigorously  monitored.  Much  goodwill  has 
been lost by the EU as monitor of the pact over 
the last two years, and it will take huge efforts to 
regain  it.  The  slightest  infringement  of  the new 
rules  will  require  immediate  action.  The  EU 
Commissioner in charge will need to be capable 
of taking a strong position as soon as a problem 
becomes apparent, without having to wait for an 
EU Council decision on the subject.  
Given  the  doubts  about  the  legitimacy  of  the 
centre to exercise control over largely local fiscal 
powers,  the  European  Parliament  should  also 
play a stronger role in this domain, in much the 
same way it does vis-à -vis the ‘Six-pack’. The EP 
specifically  proposed  the  possibility  to  demand 
testimonies  from  national  finance  ministers.  In 
addition,  an  elected  official  of  the  eurozone 
should bear political responsibility for enforcing 
the Pact, which could be performed by a national 
finance minister or a politician appointed by and 
accountable  to  the  European  Parliament.  S/he 
could  be  a  Vice-President  of  the  European 
Commission,  and  chair  the  Ecofin  meetings,  in 
the same way that the High Representative chairs 
the  Foreign  Affairs  Councils.  This  would  be  a 
better  solution  than  a  Eurozone  Council 
President,  as  proposed  by  the  October  2011 
European Council. 
Full means for new supervisory authorities  
In  response  to  the  problems  revealed  in 
adequately  supervising  the  financial  sector,  the 
EU made substantial changes in the supervisory 
structure  through  the  creation  of  European 
supervisory  authorities  (ESAs).  These  new 
entities  can  be  considered  as  embryonic  federal 
supervisory  authorities,  as  they  have  effectively 
been attributed powers that were revealed to be 
lacking  and  that  can  better  be  executed  at 
European level. These include EU-wide collection 
and  exchange  of  supervisory  information, 
mediation  between  national  supervisors  and 
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national  supervisory  authorities.  The  ESAs  can 
take decisions on individual cases in exceptional 
circumstances in emergency situations and carry 
out  some  unique  supervisory  tasks,  which  at 
present  are  most  developed  for  the  European 
Securities  and  Markets  Authority  (ESMA)  (see 
Lannoo, 2011c). 
It  is  widely  agreed,  however,  that  the  ESAs’ 
current resources are not sufficient for these tasks, 
a problem that should be addressed rapidly if the 
EU  wants  these  authorities  to  live  up  to  the 
expectations. The tasks are huge, and doubts are 
growing  as  a  result  of,  for  example,  the  delays 
with the licensing of rating agents by ESMA, the 
quality  of  the  second  stress  test  carried  out  by 
EBA  and  the  reluctance  of  national  supervisory 
authorities  to  let  the  ESAs grow  into  their  new 
roles.  The  European  Commission  and  national 
supervisory authorities should therefore urgently 
second  temporary  experts  to  the  ESAs,  and 
intervene  as  necessary  when  tensions  arise 
between national and EU authorities. 
An EU-wide deposit guarantee and bank 
resolution fund 
An  EU-wide  deposit  insurance  and  bank 
resolution fund should be established as soon as 
possible to assist banks in trouble. Unfortunately, 
the  planned  amendments  to  the  deposit 
guarantee  schemes  Directive  have  removed 
crucial  elements  of  the  Commission’s  proposal 
that  would  have  allowed  for  some  form  of  co-
financing between schemes. These developments 
are not particularly encouraging for the prospects 
of a possible EU-wide bank resolution scheme, on 
which  a  proposal  is  expected  before  the  end  of 
this year. 
Harmonisation  of  deposit  guarantee  schemes  in 
the EU was first covered by a 1994 EU Directive. 
Amendments in 2008 brought the minimum level 
of  protection  to  €100,000,  but  left  further 
harmonisation  to  be  addressed  at  a  later  stage. 
The  July  2010  Commission  draft  proposed  1) 
faster  pay-out,  2)  minimum  ex-ante  funding,  3) 
better  spending  and  4)  mutual  borrowing 
amongst  different  schemes.  Discussions  in  the 
context  of  the  first  reading  have  regrettably 
indicated  that  member states  and  the  European 
Parliament  do  not  agree  on  more  EU-wide 
harmonisation in this domain, which would have 
eliminated  many  of  the  distortions  among  the 
member  states.  Both  institutions  scrapped  the 
possibility of borrowing between schemes, which 
would have been a first step towards an EU-wide 
scheme.  Also  the  use  of  the  fund  for  other 
purposes  than  depositor  protection  appears  to 
have been rejected.  
It should be recalled that in September 2008 the 
Dutch Ministry of Finance initiated a proposal for 
a  European  bail-out  fund,  and  informally 
discussed  this  with  the  French  Ministry  of 
Finance.  The  proposal,  however,  was  firmly 
rejected by the German government ahead of the 
G-4  Elysée  Summit  of  4  October  2008.  EU 
governments preferred to resort to large national 
bail-out programmes, the consequences of which 
are still being felt today. Through the European 
Financial Stability Facility and the decision of the  
October  26th  Council,  the  EU  now  has  the 
structure  in  place  for  a  truly  European  support 
fund for the banking sector, which it did not have 
in 2008. It should put this into motion as soon as 
possible, taking into account the lessons from the 
2008  crisis  and  applying  EU  state  aid  rules.  A 
eurozone  recapitalisation  fund  would  be  much 
more  effective  in  limiting  distortions  to  the 
functioning of the single market, compared to the 
current  arrangement  of  ad  hoc  guarantees  and 
support  mechanisms.  These  funds  should  be 
conditional  on  the  introduction  of  structural 
reforms, as well as temporary and remunerated.  
In  addition  to  a  European  TARP,  a  eurozone-
wide  deposit-guarantee  scheme  should  also  be 
created.  All  banks  in  the  eurozone  would  be 
obliged to participate in a pre-funded scheme and 
to  pay  a premium  based  on  their  retail  deposit 
base.  Such  a  fund  could,  over  time,  be  merged 
with  a  European  TARP  to  become  a  market-
funded, EU-wide bank resolution scheme. 
Completing the Single Market and furthering 
the debate on economic union 
The  European  Commission  is  committed  to 
complete the single market, further to the Monti 
report  (see  Monti,  2010).  The  report  lists  12 
priority  areas  comprising  some  50  different 
proposals,  to  foster  growth  and  employment.  It 
covers  the  digital  single  market,  intellectual 
property, public procurement, corporate taxation, 
labour  mobility  and  some  measures  that  were 
also  raised  in  the  Euro-plus  Pact.  This  should 
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although the debate on the Single Market Act has 
not been phrased in this sense. In addition, the 
overlap  with  some  Euro-plus  Pact  items  is 
confusing and left unexplained. 
A  full  economic  union,  however,  is  much more 
than the Single Market Act. An economic union 
would  imply  further  integration  of  labour 
markets and a harmonisation of pension systems, 
an EU industrial policy and an integrated market 
for  professional  services  and  a  much  higher 
degree  of  harmonisation  of  direct  and  indirect 
taxes. It would be useful for the EU to stimulate a 
healthy  debate  on  economic  union  beyond  the 
single  market,  if  only  to  alert  citizens  to  how 
much  remains  to  be  done,  or  to  how  un-
integrated the EU still is. 
Conclusion 
The EU, and even more the monetary union, can 
only continue to exist if it functions as a federal 
union,  with  a  clear  hierarchy  of  rules.  The 
sovereign  debt  crisis  has  been  caused  by  a 
multiplicity of causes, but too much sovereignty 
and  too  little  federalism  presented 
insurmountable obstacles to finding a swift and 
effective solution when it first erupted and before 
it  became  a  systemic  crisis  of  the  union.  The 
solutions proposed  to  date  reinforce  the  federal 
part  somewhat,  but  there  is  still  too  much 
sovereignty and power-politics. In addition, there 
are  overlaps  between  the  rules  applying  to  the 
eurozone and to the EU as a whole, which is very 
confusing. 
As  circumstances  do  not  allow  for  more  far-
reaching reforms at this stage, European policy-
makers will need to extract the maximum out of 
the available federal instruments and institutions. 
At the same time, the EU institutions will need to 
streamline the rules and clarify the priorities. The 
European Commission will need to be extremely 
vigilant in observing the revamped Growth and 
Stability  Pact  to  regain  confidence  amongst  the 
member  states  and  EU  citizens.  The  Parliament 
will  need  to  demonstrate  that  accountability 
effectively exists at EU level, and that economic 
governance  is  not  in  the  hands  of  an 
unaccountable administration. The ECB needs to 
take  a  broad  interpretation  of  its  mandate  to 
ensure not only price stability, but also financial 
stability, in cooperation with the EFSF.  
Encouraging eurozone member states to continue 
harbouring the illusion of state sovereignty does 
not  help  to  overcome  the  current  crisis.  The 
statement  contained  in  the  October  European 
Council  conclusions  that  member  states  will 
honour  “their  own  individual  sovereign 
signatures”  allows  member  states  to  take 
monetary union hostage to national ‘sovereignty’. 
This  indeed  almost  happened  with  the  aborted 
proposal to hold a public referendum in Greece. 
The  sooner  it  is  acknowledged  that  the  nation 
state can no longer exercise monetary sovereignty 
within EMU, the better. 
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Annex: Economic convergence proposals compared 
  Euro-plus Pact  Single Market Act  Economic Union 
Goals  Improve competitiveness and 
economic convergence in the 
eurozone 
Boost growth and 
strengthen confidence 
Complete monetary 
union and delegate more 
competences in economic 
policy to the federal level 
What?  - Monitor whether wage 
setting arrangements are in 
line with productivity 
- Foster employment through 
labour market reforms 
- Promote sustainability of 
public finances through 
social security and fiscal 
reform 
- Tax policy coordination 
 
Complete the Single Market 
in: 
- Access to finance for SMEs  
-Mobility for citizens 
- Intellectual property rights 
- Consumer empowerment  
- Services  
- Networks  
- The digital single market  
- Social entrepreneurship 
- Taxation  
- Social cohesion  
- Business environment  
- Public procurement 
Not clearly defined, but 
could imply: 
- Complete single market 
- EU-wide industrial 
policy 
- More integrated 
research policy 
- EU labour market policy  
- Harmonisation of direct 
and indirect tax bases and 
rates 
Monitoring  Heads of State and 
Government 
European Commission   
 